

BOOK REVIEWS



The Army's Center of Military History has sent us copies of a number of its most recent publications, and we commend them to you as being excellent historical products:

- **ARMIES, CORPS, DIVISIONS, AND SEPARATE BRIGADES.** By John Wilson. Army Lineage Series. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00150-1. 852 Pages. \$25.00, Softbound. This is an extremely useful reference book, for it includes the lineages and honors for all the armies, corps, divisions, and separate brigades that have been organized under TOEs and have been active in the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army of the United States since the beginning of World War II. The lineages are current through 31 December 1984.

Brigade headquarters and headquarters companies organic to the combat divisions since ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Division) in the early 1960s have been incorporated. The lineages and honors for Army National Guard (ANG) divisions and their organic brigades and for ANG separate combined arms brigades that were active on 31 December 1984 are also included.

Each entry is accompanied by a color illustration of the shoulder sleeve insignia and distinctive insignia, if officially approved; a description of the heraldic items; and a bibliography.

- **MOSCOW TO STALINGRAD: DECISION IN THE EAST.** By Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer. Army Historical Series. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00140-3. 574 Pages. \$24.00. This is the second volume to be completed in a planned three-volume history of the German-Soviet conflict in World War II. The first, which was written by one of the authors of this volume, Earl Ziemke, a former mem-

ber of the Center but a long-time professor of history at the University of Georgia, was titled **STALINGRAD TO BERLIN: THE GERMAN DEFEAT IN THE EAST**. That volume appeared almost 20 years ago.

Begin by Magna Bauer, a long serving member of the Center's staff who did yeoman support work for several of the volumes in the Army's official World War II series, this book was completed by Ziemke, who was called in for that purpose after Bauer's death in 1981.

Before plunging into the narrative, the reader is cautioned to read Ziemke's preface to get a feel for the problems he faced and for his warning concerning his earlier work. The reader can be assured, though, that he has in his hands a most authoritative publication and one not likely to be equaled any time soon.

The narrative, which includes accounts of the German combat operations in the so-called Northern Theater of Operations (Finland), focuses primarily on the period between 5 December 1941 and 19 November 1942, during which the German Army's combat power began to decline even as the Soviet forces slowly acquired the means and capabilities that eventually brought them victory.

- **MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS: A TEST FOR TECHNOLOGY.** By John D. Bergen. United States Army in Vietnam Series. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-020-01035-9. 515 Pages. \$26.00, Softbound. This is the third volume to appear in the planned multi-volume official Army in Vietnam series. It covers the period from the earliest U.S. involvement in Indochina in 1945 (when a team worked with the Viet Minh's Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap) to the final U.S. withdrawal in 1975. Its emphasis is on the building

and installing of communications facilities rather than on signal operations. The author does tell of the difficulties signal communications units faced supporting such operations as the Ia Drang battle in early 1966, and Operations ATTLEBORO, CEDAR FALLS, JUNCTION CITY, AND PEGASUS. The last four chapters are devoted to discussions of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong communications systems, the electronic battlefield, and the U.S. signalmen and their equipment.

As a former serving Signal Corps officer, the author has a soft spot in his heart for the small unit radio-telephone operators (RTOs). At the same time, he believes that, based on our Vietnam experience, command and control on the battlefield "do not necessarily improve as communications improve" and that what we will need in our next war is a coherent and comprehensive approach to information processing" that will define "the relationship between computers, communications, and command and control."

- **THE HUKBALAHAP INSURRECTION: A CASE STUDY OF A SUCCESSFUL ANTI-INSURGENCY OPERATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1955.** By Lawrence M. Greenberg. Historical Analysis Series. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00162-4. 159 Pages. \$8.50, Softbound. First printed in 1986, this publication, the seventh in the Center's historical analysis series, has been reprinted in its entirety. The author, a serving Army officer at the time he wrote this study, looks at the background of the Huk movement; discusses the Philippine response and the country's charismatic leader, Ramon Magsaysay, the Secretary of National Defense; and analyzes the actions taken by the U.S. Army to assist Magsaysay. The study was prepared for the Army's Chief of Staff on short notice, which

prevented the author from using much primary material.

Regardless, many of the issues he surfaces are certainly relevant to the Army's current and future concerns and, as the author puts it, "the successful result is one worthy of consideration for contemporary and future application."

- **THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, 1818-1865.** By Mary C. Gillett. Army Historical Series. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00152-7. 371 Pages. \$17.00, Softbound. This, the second in a projected four-volume series that will cover the history of the Army Medical Department from 1775 to 1941, traces the development of the department from its establishment on a permanent basis in 1818 through the Civil War's final days in 1865. (The author also wrote the first volume in the series: **THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, 1775-1818.**)

The coverage of military operations is limited to that necessary for an understanding of the department's work and organization, and the efforts of the medical officers are evaluated according to the standards of their time. Roughly one-half of the narrative is devoted to the Civil War years, during which, as the author writes, "more than 12,000 medical officers—regulars, volunteers, and contract—examined over 250,000 wounds and treated more than 7 million cases of disease. In the course of their duties, more than 300 Army surgeons died from wounds, disease, or accidents." By the end of the war, "an effective and efficient medical department for the large and active Union Army" had been created.

- **THE INSPECTORS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1777-1903.** By David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00148-9. 484 Pages. \$18.00. The authors' primary purpose was to explain "how inspection in the Army evolved and why things are done the way they are." They explain the relationship the inspectors of the period under discussion had to the military chain of command as well as to the

Government's civilian representatives, and examine the role of the inspectorate under wartime and peacetime conditions. They also discuss the personalities and careers of the officers who served as inspectors general during the period covered by this book. Their book includes a large amount of valuable information about the daily concerns that influenced the development of the Army as a whole, although its primary emphasis is on the organization and operation of the inspectorate itself.



- **U.S. ARMY MOBILIZATION AND LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR: A RESEARCH APPROACH.** By Terrence J. Gough. Center of Military History, 1988. USGPO S/N 008-029-00154-3. 136 Pages. \$4.25, Softbound. Through a discussion of the available literature, the author presents an overview of the most pertinent issues that evolved from our Korean War mobilization and logistics experiences. He suggests that further investigation might elaborate on particular issues (chapter 2) and offers topics that warrant further research (chapter 3). (The book's first chapter contains a chronological summary of the major mobilization and logistics events of the war years.)

Everything in this compact publication points to the fact that the Army's

planners of the future must learn as much as they can about how the Army accomplished its most recent wartime mobilization effort, and the concurrent problems it faced in matching that effort to the demands of a limited war.

Here are a number of other publications you should find of interest:

- **LOW INTENSITY WARFARE.** Edited by Michael T. Klare and Peter Korubluh (Pantheon Books, 1988. 250 Pages. \$19.95). Reviewed by Major Douglas A. Martz, United States Army.

This book represents an intellectual exercise in reviewing the current status of what the editors have chosen to call "low intensity warfare"—the same thing most soldiers would recognize as low intensity conflict. It is not a book that reviews either the current doctrine on or current thinking about low intensity conflict. It is, rather, a political assessment made from the particular perspective of informed intellectuals who "believe it essential that the American people become more familiar with official thinking on low intensity warfare, and press for an open national debate on the costs and perils of L.I.C. doctrine. Such a debate must consider two broad issues: the probable military consequences of U.S. intervention abroad, and the political and moral consequences at home."

It fulfills its purpose with rhetoric that, at times, falls shrilly on the reader's ears and sensibilities, for the "open, national debate" as presented by the essayists is certainly one-sided. Objectivity is not overly stressed.

The editors present a series of essays by well-intentioned and occasionally well-known liberal scholars, foundation members, and former government workers who either have or have had at least a passing interest in and some involvement with low intensity conflict—exclusively at the thinking level. For that reason, this book breaks new ground for the serious military reader because it allows those who live with the reality of potential low intensity conflicts some hard core insights into what the opposition thinks, what some of its potential arguments will be, and what positions it carves out for

itself and subsequently inhabits.

Overall, the book is both difficult and maddening to read because of its deliberate, unconcealed bias. It contains nothing new regarding the fundamentals of low intensity conflict, the doctrine behind it, or the equipment and organizations that support it. The value of the book lies in what it reveals about those who neither understand nor appreciate the necessity for the force structure, composition, and doctrine of the U.S. military services or the dedication of the men and women who may be deployed around the world in low intensity conflicts.

The book promises a lot. It delivers much less.

THE ONLY WAR WE HAD: A PLATOON LEADER'S JOURNAL OF VIETNAM. By Michael Lee Lanning (Ballantine Books, 1987. 293 Pages. \$3.50, Softbound). Reviewed by Captain Tim Mishkofski, United States Army.

When a friend handed me a copy of this book to read, I was skeptical of its content. After all, many books have been published in recent years about the Vietnam War, most of which are not very good. I was pleasantly surprised.

What sets this book apart from others about the U.S. infantry in Vietnam is the clarity and precision with which the author (now a serving Army Lieutenant Colonel stationed in Washington, D.C.) describes his time as a platoon leader in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in Vietnam in 1969. Lanning's work is instructive in that it confirms the fact that small unit dynamics are the same regardless of the date or the battlefield.

But Lanning does more—he tells the story of what Vietnam did to the U.S. Army at its most elemental level. Aside from its tactical value, therefore, the book serves as a teaching primer on soldier psychology. The 199th was not the heralded 82d Airborne or the mechanized 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Its soldiers walked most places and were in intimate contact with their tormentors—the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army—as well as

the tormented—the Vietnamese people.

The peculiar irony of having half a million troops on the ground in a country but with only a handful actually pursuing the enemy is the main feeling I took away from this book. The distrust and dislike shown by the combat soldiers for the support soldiers and vice versa was cancerous then—as it is now. Too many people in the Army tend to think of the infantrymen as “those animals with low GI scores.”

Lanning's platoon was not made up of college-deferred yuppies-in-training. His soldiers were the poor and the powerless tramping through a country of poor and powerless people.

The officers and men of that era have risen to power in our Army but not in our society. Young leaders of today who do not share the inner sense of abandonment of the Vietnam “grunt” need to read this book and try to understand what it is Lanning is saying.

On the surface, today's Army is well. But grind it down to the force of 1969 and you'll find the same faces, and the same questions. It is leadership under these circumstances that makes this book so valuable for the education of today's soldier.

BOLD DRAGOON: THE LIFE OF J.E.B. STUART. By Emory Thomas (Harper and Row, 1986. 354 Pages. \$22.95). Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

He became known both in legend and in fact as one of the most dashing, daring cavalry leaders of the Civil War, North or South. One of his foes, a Federal corps commander, described him as “the greatest cavalryman ever foaled in America.”

James Ewell Brown Stuart was only 31 years of age and a major general when he was killed at Yellow Tavern, Virginia, in May 1864, but he had built a distinguished record during his tenure as Robert E. Lee's cavalry commander in the Army of Northern Virginia.

The author, a noted Civil War historian and professor of history at the University of Georgia, takes a

refreshing new look at Stuart's life and career, and provides an even-handed treatment of Stuart, the friend and family man, as well as Stuart, the military commander.

While Stuart thrived on grand cavalry reviews and the adulation he received from Southern women during periods off the battlefield, he demonstrated a masterful appreciation for cavalry's key roles in scouting, screening, and raiding. While spectacular raids earned him great acclaim, his abilities as a military leader were proven on numerous less-publicized occasions and were fully appreciated by Lee.

Unlike other famous cavalry leaders such as Nathan B. Forrest, Wade Hampton, Joseph Wheeler, and Philip Sheridan, Stuart seemed more capable in myriad areas. Thus, he was able to command both large and small numbers of horsemen, to integrate his cavalry with artillery and infantry, or to conduct independent operations.

Stuart's career was not without its dark moments, such as his failure to find and assist Lee during the critical first days of the Gettysburg campaign. His fall finally came when General Sheridan was sent with 10,000 troopers and one mission—to destroy Stuart.

This is a well-written and readable biography of a man who considered himself “a bold dragoon” and who lived the life to prove it. Thomas provides an in-depth look at not only the cavalry operations in the eastern theater during the Civil War but also the councils of war in which Stuart participated and the periodic reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia to meet the changing demands of the war.

MARCH OR DIE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION. By Tony Geraghty (Facts on File, 1986. 352 Pages. \$19.95). Reviewed by Leroy Thompson.

Over the past 50 years, at least a dozen histories of the French Foreign Legion have appeared in English. This new one is not only the most readable but is also in many ways the most probing, because it goes beyond the events that have created the myth of the

Legion to examine the relationship between the French government and the Foreign Legion. Special emphasis is placed on the way the Legion has been used and abused throughout its existence.

Perhaps the relationship of the Legion and politics is nowhere better handled than in the chapters on World War II in which the 13th DBLE, which formed the basis for Charles DeGaulle's Free French forces, is contrasted with the Legion units that remained pro-Vichy. Then, the author's analysis of the Legion during the Algerian conflict and the revolt of the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment shows that this was not so much a revolt against the government as a revolt against what the *Legionnaires*, men who put great stress on soldierly honor, viewed as a dishonorable act on the part of the French government.

The author's final chapter on the Legion today is especially useful in placing the Legion in context as the keystone of France's own rapid deployment force for use in the colonial spheres of interest that France seeks to maintain.

His book is recommended both as sound, readable history and as an astute analysis of the unique political situation the Legion has always found itself in.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF: FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, HIS LIEUTENANTS, AND THEIR WAR. By Eric Larrabee (Harper and Row, 1987. 723 Pages. \$25.00). Reviewed by Doctor Charles E. White, USAIS Historian.

Few Presidents of the United States have ever exercised their constitutional authority as "commander in chief" with such determination and skill as did Franklin Delano Roosevelt during World War II. In this, probably the best account yet written about FDR and his relations with his military leaders, Eric Larrabee examines the extent and importance of Roosevelt's role in selecting his military leaders and directing the country's wartime effort.

What makes this book so worthwhile

and relevant today is the manner in which the author brings together the best sources in the field to tell a marvelous story about how our political and military leaders learned war by reading books and how our soldiers trained for war as late as 1940 with dummy weapons, and yet, despite all of their shortcomings, planned and executed some of the most brilliant military campaigns in history. The U.S. in World War II deployed forces around the globe, fought on several continents simultaneously, and achieved victory in every theater of operations. No other nation has ever accomplished as much. In Larrabee's opinion, it was FDR's leadership that proved to be the driving force behind our success.

What the reader soon discovers is a source book on U.S. military leadership during the war—Generals George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Henry H. Arnold, Joseph W. Stilwell, Alexander A. Vandergrift, and Curtis LeMay; and Admirals Ernest J. King and Chester W. Nimitz. In fact, the book is built around biographies of these military men.

Roosevelt's greatest contribution to victory was the quality of his appointments. They were outstanding. Throughout the war Roosevelt faced many hard choices and he always based his decisions on the needs of the alliance. His selection of Eisenhower to command the Normandy invasion is the best example.

Roosevelt never lost his sense of purpose, and clearly made war an instrument of politics. He was a superb leader and strategic planner. He was, quite definitely, the commander-in-chief.

THE FORGOTTEN WAR: AMERICA IN KOREA, 1950-1953. By Clay Blair (Times Books, 1987. 1,123 Pages. \$29.95). Reviewed by Captain William B. Crews, United States Army.

If you are expecting a heroic saga in the manner of Robert Leckie's *MARCH TO GLORY*, you will be dis-

appointed. Rather, Clay Blair, well known writer and biographer, explores the political decisions leading up to the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 and the military actions from that date until a stalemate was reached in 1953.

Relying heavily on primary source documents and personal memoirs, Blair paints a rather unpleasant portrait of an Army rife with complacency and retirement-age officers; units deprived of equipment because of niggardly budgets; and a Far East Command totally out of touch with reality and with the country's civilian leadership.

His book is almost a day-by-day account of the first year of the war (less so for the last two years), and it is refreshing for its candor. Reliefs from command are identified as such, defeats are admitted, and victories are lauded. Blair fairly idolizes successful leaders such as Michaelis of the 27th Infantry Regiment and Freeman of the 23d Infantry Regiment, but excoriates those less capable.

Technically, the book has certain flaws that annoy a student of the Korean War. Blair has an unnatural aversion to dates, and there are times when a reader has to retreat to a known date to count the number of days covered in the narrative. He uses incredibly extensive footnotes, and there is no bibliography. Commanders are often referred to by their nicknames and rank is seldom mentioned. Maps are few and far between and often omit key towns, phase lines, and terrain features. There are other flaws as well.

The reader must also be alert to Blair's own prejudices. One often feels he has neatly divided the Eighth Army into "white hats" and "black hats" and has not given the "black hats" a chance to defend themselves. And while he implies several conclusions in the body of his book, he ends it abruptly without commenting on the significance of the war. His exhaustive research deserved better treatment than it received.

For all of its shortcomings as history, it is easy—at times engrossing—reading and is recommended for anyone interested in either the Korean War or

the social history of the United States Army.

In today's climate of budget cuts, many would do well to read Blair's analysis of the effects of the dismemberment of the U.S. armed forces by the Truman administration in an attempt to balance the ledger books.

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN COMBAT PSYCHIATRY. Edited by Gregory Belenky (Greenwood Press, 1987. 271 Pages. \$39.95). Reviewed by Major Lisle K. Brook, United States Army.

This is an excellent selection of essays written by specialists from England, Canada, Israel, Egypt, West Germany, the United States, and other countries. They are generally written in a layman's terms and cover a variety of topics in addition to combat psychiatry.

The book is organized into three parts: the role of group cohesion and personality in maintaining effective performance in combat; the neurobiology of military and combat stress; and the psychological context of performance in combat. Numerous tables and figures support the essays, and the editor effectively links the essays with an informative introduction and conclusion.

Modern killing technology has increased the potential for combat-related psychiatric problems. The Arab-Israeli wars have shown that modern warfare will cause high numbers of battle stress casualties. Both military and civilian leaders should read this book to understand the causes, prevention, and treatment of such casualties.

It is especially recommended for infantry leaders because they have the professional obligation of understanding the behavior and emotions of their soldiers when they are placed under the stress of combat.

THE PERFECT FAILURE: KENNEDY, EISENHOWER, AND THE CIA AT THE BAY OF PIGS. By Trumbull Higgins (Norton, 1987. 224 Pages. \$17.95). Reviewed by Doctor

Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Military historian Trumbull Higgins's five previous books have focused on war planning and military miscalculation in World War II and Korea. As a chronicler of military failures, he now turns his attention to one of the ultimate fiascos of the postwar world, the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation of April 1961. How could the combined efforts of the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA under two Presidents result in such a disaster?

Based upon interviews and recently released documents, Higgins relates a story of vacillating government officials, ambitious but poorly informed intelligence operatives, and frustrated military critics, as well as an overreliance upon undercover activities and military technology, especially the panacea of air power. He gives good insight into the approach taken by and the vulnerabilities of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and for the first time the critics of the operation are given a significant hearing.

Higgins's liberal point of view is strong. His biases are clear, and the book is overly judgmental and outspoken about individuals and policy. A didactic tone predominates throughout. Since the focus of this brief book is decision making, it is not as detailed on the actual events as is Peter Wyden's *The Bay of Pigs* (1979).

But all considered, this is an interesting and useful contribution to the literature. Moreover, it causes us to think about our covert activities later in Laos and Vietnam, as well as the same problems of communication, absentee command, and lack of good local intelligence evident in the invasion of Grenada, which *luckily* turned out better than did that of Cuba.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED BRITISH SECURITY POLICY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1990s. By Martin Holmes, et al. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Special Report 1987. Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987. 140 Pages. \$9.95, Softbound.

WILD BLUE YONDER: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE B1 BOMBER. By Nick Kotz.

Pantheon Books, 1988. 314 Pages. \$19.95.

THE REAL WAR. By Jonathan Schell. A Reprint with a New Essay by the Author. Pantheon Books, 1988. 398 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE. By T. J. Gander. Hippocrene Books, 1988. 128 Pages. \$22.50.

GAS ATTACK: CHEMICAL WARFARE 1915 TO THE PRESENT DAY. By William Moore. Hippocrene Books, 1987. 262 Pages. \$22.50.

THE BUSHMASTERS: AMERICA'S JUNGLE WARRIORS OF WORLD WAR II. By Anthony Arthur. St. Martin's, 1987. 270 Pages. \$18.95.

WINNING THE RADAR WAR, 1939-1945. By Jack Nissen, with A. W. Cockerill. St. Martin's, 1988. 224 Pages. \$19.95.

THE NIGHT TOKYO BURNED. By Hito Edo. St. Martin's, 1988. 248 Pages. \$16.95.

THE LONG WAIT: THE FORGING OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NUCLEAR ALLIANCE, 1945-1958. By Timothy J. Botti. Contributions in Military Studies Number 64. Greenwood Press, 1987. 272 Pages. \$39.95.

THE LAST GAITER BUTTON: A STUDY OF THE MOBILIZATION AND CONCENTRATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE WAR OF 1870. By Thomas J. Adriance. Contributions in Military Studies Number 73. Greenwood Press, 1987. 192 Pages. \$32.95.

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. By the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate Select Committee, 1987. 708 Pages. \$29.00, Softbound. USGPO S/N 052-070-06378-5.

THE ARAB MILITARY OPTION. By General Saad El-Shazly. American Mideast Research (3315 Sacramento Street, Suite 511, San Francisco, CA 94118), 1986. 329 Pages. \$26.00.

A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI ARMY, 1874 TO THE PRESENT. By Ze'ev Schiff. Macmillan, 1986. 304 Pages. \$24.00.

TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN. Edited by Benjamin Netanyahu. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1986. 254 Pages. \$18.95.

TO SERVE WITH HONOR: A TREATISE ON MILITARY ETHICS AND THE WAY OF THE SOLDIER. By Richard A. Gabriel. Praeger, 1987. 243 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

WAR ANNUAL I. By John Laffin. Brassey's, 1986. 187 Pages. \$14.74, Softbound.

ZONES OF CONFLICT: AN ATLAS OF FUTURE WARS. By John Keegan and Andrew Wheatecroft. Simon and Schuster, 1986. 158 Pages. \$10.95, Softbound.

THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR: TUNNEL WARFARE. By Tom Mangold and John Penycate. Bantam Books, 1987. 158 Pages. \$6.95, Softbound.

THE MILITARY RETIREE'S SOURCEBOOK. By the Vanguard Editorial Staff. Vanguard, 2211 Lee Road, Suite 103 (Code PR), Winter Park, FL 32789. 1987. 100 Pages. Softbound.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR: THE MEDICS' WAR. By Albert E. Cowdrey. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. USGPO S/N 008-029-00147-1. 416 Pages. \$21.00.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 1987-1988. Office of the Federal Register, 1987. USGPO S/N 069-000-00006-1. 892 Pages. \$20.00, Softbound.